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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Tony Ray Brown appeals from his conviction and sentence for aggravated 
battery. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
In December 2010, Richard Wilson invited the victim in this case, 
Jesseray Bell, to a party at a motel in Emmett, Idaho. (PSI, p.2.) Mr. Bell went to 
the motel and as he walked around the corner towards the motel room, Brown hit 
Mr. Bell in the head with a baseball bat and knocked him to the ground. (PSI, 
pp.2, 5.) Brown said that he "only hit [Mr. Bell] with the bat once because it broke 
after the first hit." (PSI, p.5.) While Mr. Bell was on the ground, "two individuals 
continued to kick him in the head seven to eight more times." (PSI, p.2.) Brown 
admitted to hitting Mr. Bell "three or four more times" with his left hand after he 
broke the baseball bat over Mr. Bell's head, but he denied kicking Mr. Bell in the 
head. (PSI, p.5.) Brown also hit another individual in the head with his fist after 
the individual came out of the motel room to see what was happening outside. 
(PSI, p.3.) 
Mr. Bell's initial injuries consisted of "a broken cheek bone, a large gash 
between his eyes, torn cartilage in his left ear, a crushed nose, his head was split 
open in the back, his right eye was swollen shut, bruises and scratches on his 
hand from trying to protect his face, and hematomas all over his face and head." 
(PSI, p.4.) Brown later stated that his intended victim was Mr. Wilson, not Mr. 
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Bell. 1 (PSI, p.5.) Brown also stated that his intentions were "not to kill [Mr. 
Wilson), but to beat him up." (PSI, p.5.) 
The state charged Brown with aggravated battery. (R., pp.40-41.) Brown 
was notified that "by pleading guilty you waive or give up your right against 
compulsory self-incrimination, which is the right to remain silent or not to 
incriminate yourself." (R, p.17.) He pied guilty without a plea agreement. 
(2/28/11 Tr., p.2, L.17 - p.3, L.19.) 
At the sentencing hearing, the following exchange took place after the 
district court heard sentencing recommendations from both sides: 
THE COURT: Thank you. All right. Mr. Brown, anything you want 
to say? 
THE DEFENDANT: No. 
THE COURT: No? I think you really do need to say it. It may be 
difficult to say. 
THE DEFENDANT: I apologize for everything. I really do. 
THE COURT: What led you here, Mr. Brown? 
THE DEFENDANT: I don't want to speak. 
THE COURT: Pardon? 
THE DEFENDANT: I don't want to talk about it. 
1 The record contains several inconsistent explanations for why Brown wanted to 
attack Mr. Wilson. Brown claimed that Mr. Wilson threatened to kill Brown's 
girlfriend's child. (PSI, p.5.) However, Brown's girlfriend claimed that Brown was 
"after" Mr. Wilson because Mr. Wilson was having sex with an underage girl. 
(PSI, p.4.) It was also reported that Brown and Mr. Wilson were both drug 
dealers who were having a "turf war" (PSI, p.3), and that Mr. Wilson was the 
intended target of the attack because he had implicated one of Brown's friends in 
another battery that occurred a month earlier (12/29/10 Emmett Police 
Department Supplemental Report by Lt. Knittel (PSI attachment)). 
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THE COURT: No. I think that's part of it I think you need to talk 
about it. It's part of the responsibility. 
THE DEFENDANT: Richard [Wilson] said he was going to kill my 
girlfriend's kids, so that's how we got there. 
(4/25/11 Tr., p.23, L.24 - p.24, L.17.) 
The district court questioned Brown further about his explanation for why 
he committed this crime because "[t]here were a lot of different explanations 
about why you were after Richard Wilson." (4/25/11 Tr., p.24, L.18 - p.26, L.5.) 
The district court noted that Brown's explanation "doesn't add up" because 
Brown's girlfriend "never said anything about the reason [for the attack] being 
that it was because of some threat to her child." (4/25/11 Tr., p.26, Ls.8-16.) 
The district court also noted that even if Brown's explanation for why he wanted 
to attack Mr. Wilson was true, Brown's actions were not "justified" because this 
"was an absolutely barbaric approach to justice." (4/25/11 Tr., p.30, Ls.19-24.) 
The district court later asked Brown: 
THE COURT: Where would you get the idea to take a bat to 
somebody instead of a fist, which is bad enough? 
THE DEFENDANT: What would have happened if he would have 
killed her? Killed her kid? 
THE COURT: All right. You tell me what - you tell me what it 
was, 'cause this is sure not in here, that was so - that was such a 
threat that she doesn't even mention it in any of the reports. What 
was so significant and so 
THE DEFENDANT: It obviously didn't happen, so it doesn't matter. 
THE COURT: I'm wanting to hear what you have to say. 
THE DEFENDANT: I don't want to say anything else. 
(4/25/11 Tr., p.31, Ls.8-23.) 
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The district court asked Brown several other questions about the threat 
that Mr. Wilson allegedly made regarding Brown's girlfriend's child and then 
proceeded with sentencing. (4/25/11 Tr., p.31, L.24 - p.33, LS.) The district 
court imposed a unified sentence of 15 years with four years fixed. (R., pp.58-
59; 4/25/11 Tr., p.40, Ls.9-12.) Thereafter, Brown filed a Rule 35 motion (Rule 
35 Motion, pp.1-2 (augmentation)), which was denied without a hearing (Order 
on Rule 35 Motion, pp.1-6 (augmentation)). Brown timely appealed. (R., pp.60-
61.) 
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ISSUES 
Brown states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Whether the district court violated Mr. Brown's state and 
federal constitutional rights to be free from self-incrimination 
by compelling him to make a statement during the 
sentencing hearing.r21 
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion when it 
imposed a unified sentence of fifteen years, with four years 
fixed, upon Mr. Brown following his plea of guilty to 
aggravated battery with a deadly weapon. 
(Appellant's brief, p.7.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Brown failed to establish a violation of his Fifth Amendment rights, let 
alone that such a violation in this case constituted fundamental error? 
2. Has Brown failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing 
discretion? 
2 Because Brown does not argue that the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution should be applied any differently than Article I, Section 13 of the 
Idaho Constitution (see generally Appellant's brief), the state will refer solely to 
the Fifth Amendment in its brief. See State v. Curless, 137 Idaho 138, 142, 44 
P.3d 1193, 1197 (Ct. App. 2002). 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Brown Has Failed To Establish A Violation Of His Fifth Amendment Rights, Let 
Alone That Such A Violation In This Case Constituted Fundamental Error 
A. Introduction 
At no time during the sentencing hearing did Brown or his attorney object 
to the district court's questioning based on Fifth Amendment grounds. (See 
generally 4/25/11 Tr.) Instead, Brown contends for the first time on appeal that 
the district court violated his "state and federal constitutional rights to be free 
from self-incrimination by compelling him to speak at his sentencing hearing 
against his will." (Appellant's brief, p.15.) A review of the record, however, 
reveals that the district court did not violate Brown's right against self-
incrimination at the sentencing hearing, and in any event, Brown has failed to 
show fundamental error. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely 
objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal." 
State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). Whether 
the issue was preserved is a "threshold" inquiry. State v. Stevens, 115 Idaho 
457, 459, 767 P.2d 832, 834 (Ct. App. 1989). Absent a timely objection, the 
appellate courts of this state will only review an alleged error under the 
fundamental error doctrine. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 P.3d 961, 
979 (2010). Review under the fundamental error doctrine requires Brown to 
demonstrate the error he alleges: "(1) violates one or more of [hisJ unwaived 
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constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional 
information not contained in the appellate record, including information as to 
whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless." 
Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980. 
C. Brown Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Violated One Of 
His Unwaived Constitutional Rights 
Brown cannot satisfy the first prong of the fundamental error test because 
he cannot demonstrate that one of his unwaived constitutional rights was 
violated. In general, "[a]ny effort by the State to compel respondent to testify 
against his will at the sentencing hearing clearly would contravene the Fifth 
Amendment." State v. Wilkins, 125 Idaho 215,218,868 P.2d 1231, 1234 (1994) 
(quoting Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 462-63 (1981)). However, "[i]t is settled 
law that a plea of guilty waives the privilege against self-incrimination, and that 
the waiver continues during the sentencing phase." State v. Jones, 129 Idaho 
471, 475, 926 P.2d 1318, 1322 (Ct. App. 1996) (citations omitted). Accordingly, 
the sentencing court in a guilty plea case is permitted to question the defendant 
regarding "matters into which the trial court could have inquired at the time of the 
guilty plea." Wilkins, 125 Idaho at 218, 868 P.2d at 1234 (emphasis added). 
"This limited waiver precludes a district court from compelling a defendant to 
testify about matters extending beyond the facts of the offense to which he 
pleads guilty." State v. Heffern, 130 Idaho 946, 948, 950 P.2d 1285, 1287 (Ct. 
App. 1997). 
Brown was notified that "by pleading guilty you waive or give up your right 
against compulsory self-incrimination, which is the right to remain silent or not to 
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incriminate yourself' (R., p.17), and he pied guilty to aggravated battery (2/28/11 
Tr., p.3, Ls.7-19). At the sentencing hearing, the district court asked Brown is 
there "anything you want to say?" and Brown responded, "[n)o." (4/25/11 Tr., 
p.23, L.25 - p.24, L.2.) The district court also asked "[w]hat led you here, Mr. 
Brown?" and Brown responded by stating "I don't want to speak" and "I don't 
want to talk about it." (4/25/11 Tr., p.24, Ls.7-11.) The district court then told 
Brown that he needed to respond to the question and Brown explained that his 
motive for committing the crime was that "Richard [Wilson] said he was going to 
kill my girlfriend's kids so that's how we got there." (4/25/11 Tr., p.24, Ls.12-17.) 
The district court pointed out the fact that Brown's explanation for why he 
committed the crime was inconsistent with the reasons provided by other 
witnesses and then asked Brown to explain what "was such a threat that 
[Brown's girlfriend] didn't even mention it in any of the reports." (4/25/11 Tr., 
p.24, L.18 - p.26, L.16; p.31, Ls.13-17.) Brown responded by stating "[i)t 
obviously didn't happen, so it doesn't matter." (4/25/11 Tr., p.31, Ls.18-19.) The 
district court told Brown, "I'm wanting to hear what you have to say" and Brown 
stated, "I don't want to say anything else." (4/25/11 Tr., p.31, Ls.20-23.) The 
district court asked Brown further questions regarding his motive for committing 
the crime and Brown repeated the explanation that he provided to the 
presentence investigator. (4/25/11 Tr., p.31, L.24 - p.32, L.24; PSI, p.5.) 
All of the questions asked by the district court at sentencing were 
appropriate because they regarded matters into which the trial court could have 
inquired at the time of the guilty plea. In cases where Idaho courts have held that 
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a defendant's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was violated at 
sentencing following a guilty plea, the defendant was either required to testify to 
"matters that went well beyond the facts of the case and information that would 
have been appropriate to determine whether he pleaded guilty freely and 
voluntarily," Wilkins, 125 Idaho at 218, 868 P.2d at 1234, or matters that were 
"factually and legally unrelated to the ... offense to which [the defendant] pied 
guilty." Heffern, 130 Idaho at 949, 950 P.2d at 1288. 
In this case, there is no indication in the record that the district court went 
beyond the limited waiver of Brown's right against self-incrimination and 
compelled Brown to answer questions that went beyond the facts of the crime he 
pied guilty to. Brown's state of mind when he committed aggravated battery and 
his proposed justification for doing so were certainly relevant to the proceedings. 
However, Brown argues that once the district court "concluded that Mr. Brown 
had offered his guilty plea 'freely, voluntarily, [andJ knowingly,' and accepted that 
plea as valid[,] ... Mr. Brown's limited waiver ended, and he was free to rely on 
the rights against self-incrimination at his subsequent sentencing hearing." 
(Appellant's brief, p.11.) This argument misstates the relevant case law. 
In Wilkins, 125 Idaho at 218, 868 P.2d at 1234, the Idaho Supreme Court 
held that "[a]lthough Estelle involved sentencing following a guilty verdict, and 
this case involves sentencing following a plea of guilty, the principle stated in 
Estelle)! that "[a]ny effort by the State to compel respondent to testify against his 
will at the sentencing hearing clearly would contravene the Fifth Amendment" is 
"equally applicable, except as to the matters into which the trial court could have 
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inquired at the time of the guilty plea." This rule allows the district court to 
question the defendant about anything at the sentencing hearing that the district 
court could have inquired into at the time of the guilty plea. It does not preclude 
the district court from asking the defendant questions about the facts of the case 
at the sentencing hearing if the district court has already accepted the 
defendant's guilty plea prior to sentencing. 
If as Brown proposes, the limited waiver of a defendant's right against self-
incrimination ends once the district court accepts a guilty plea, the only situation 
in which the district court could question a defendant regarding the underlying 
facts of the case at sentencing would be if the district court had not already 
determined whether the guilty plea was voluntarily and knowingly given. (See 
Appellant's brief, p.11.) Under Idaho Criminal Rule 11 (c), such a plea would be 
invalid. It is highly unlikely that the Wilkins Court intended to create an exception 
to the rule requiring the district court to determine whether a plea has been 
voluntarily and knowingly given prior to entry of a guilty plea. As such, Brown's 
argument that his limited waiver of his Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination ended when the district court accepted his guilty plea should be 
rejected. Brown has failed to demonstrate that one of his unwaived constitutional 
rights was violated by the district court and he has therefore failed to satisfy the 
first prong of the fundamental error test. 
D. The Error That Brown Alleges Is Not Clear Or Obvious On The Record 
Brown has also failed to satisfy the second prong of the fundamental error 
test. Under the second prong of the fundamental error test, the defendant must 
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establish not only that there was an error, but that there was an error that is 
"clear or obvious" on the record, "without the need for any additional information" 
including information "as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision." 
Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. 
Brown argues that he "invoked his rights against self-incrimination four 
different times during his sentencing hearing." (Appellant's brief, p.12.) 
However, it is not clear or obvious from the record that Brown was invoking his 
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, as opposed to simply refusing 
to speak or attempting to waive some other right such as his right of allocution. 
See State v. Goldman, 107 Idaho 209, 212, 687 P.2d 599, 602 (Ct. App. 1984) 
(discussing waiver of the right of allocution). 
In general, "if a witness desires the protection of the privilege [against self-
incrimination]. the witness must claim it or he or she will not be considered to 
have been compelled within the meaning of the [Fifth] Amendment." Curless, 
137 Idaho at 143, 44 P.3d at 1198. "When a witness invokes the Fifth 
Amendment in response to a question, the trial court must determine whether the 
refusal to answer is in fact justifiable under the privilege." Whiteley v. State, 131 
Idaho 323,327,955 P.2d 1102, 1106 (1998) (citing Hoffman v. United States, 
341 U.S. 479,486 (1951); McPherson v. McPherson, 112 Idaho 402,404, 732 
P.2d 371, 373 (Ct. App. 1987)). "In order to inform the court's decision of 
whether the answer to a question might be incriminating, the individual asserting 
the privilege 'must sketch a plausible scenario of how a potential response would 
provide direct or circumstantial evidence of criminal conduct or clues leading to 
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evidence of criminal conduct."' Whiteley. 131 Idaho at 327-28, 955 P.2d at 1106-
07 (quoting McPherson, 112 Idaho at 405, 732 P.2d at 374.) 'Thus, the privilege 
must be supported by more than a vague, subjective fear of prosecution." 
Whiteley, 131 Idaho at 328, 955 P.2d at 1107. 
Brown contends that he invoked the privilege against self-incrimination by 
"telling the district court several times that he did not wish to speak" and that the 
district court violated his Fifth Amendment rights by "compel[ing] him to make 
several statements." (Appellant's brief, p.8.) As stated above, the district court 
did not violate Brown's constitutional rights because Brown waived his privilege 
against self-incrimination as it related to the factual basis for his conviction. 
Furthermore, to the extent that Brown retained the limited right to assert the 
privilege against self-incrimination, he has failed to establish that it is clear or 
obvious from the record that he even asserted the privilege. During Brown's 
sentencing hearing, the following exchange took place: 
THE COURT: Thank you. All right. Mr. Brown, anything you want 
to say? 
THE DEFENDANT: No. 
THE COURT: No? I think you really do need to say it. It may be 
difficult to say. 
THE DEFENDANT: I apologize for everything. I really do. 
THE COURT: What led you here, Mr. Brown? 
THE DEFENDANT: I don't want to speak. 
THE COURT: Pardon? 
THE DEFENDANT: I don't want to talk about it. 
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THE COURT: No. I think that's part of it. I think you need to talk 
about it. It's part of the responsibility. 
THE DEFENDANT: Richard [Wilson] said he was going to kill my 
girlfriend's kids, so that's how we got there. 
(4/25/11 Tr., p.23, L.24 - p.24, L.17.) 
The district court questioned Brown further about his explanation for why 
he committed this crime because "[tJhere were a lot of different explanations 
about why you were after Richard Wilson." (4/25/11 Tr., p.24, L.18 - p.26, L.5.) 
The district court noted that Brown's explanation "doesn't add up" because 
Brown's girlfriend "never said anything about the reason [for the attack] being 
that it was because of some threat to her child." (4/25/11 Tr., p.26, Ls.8-16.) 
The district court later asked Brown: 
THE COURT: Where would you get the idea to take a bat to 
somebody instead of a fist, which is bad enough? 
THE DEFENDANT: What would have happened if he would have 
killed her? Killed her kid? 
THE COURT: All right. You tell me what - you tell me what it 
was, 'cause this is sure not in here, that was so - that was such a 
threat that she doesn't even mention it in any of the reports. What 
was so significant and so -
THE DEFENDANT: It obviously didn't happen, so it doesn't matter. 
THE COURT: I'm wanting to hear what you have to say. 
THE DEFENDANT: I don't want to say anything else. 
(4/25/11 Tr., p.31, Ls.8-23.) 
The statements that Brown made during this exchange with the district 
court at the sentencing hearing were insufficient to invoke the privilege against 
self-incrimination. Although "no ritualistic formula or talismanic phrase is 
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essential in order to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination," Emspak v. 
United States, 349 U.S. 190, 194 (1955), a claim of the privilege against self-
incrimination must be "sufficiently definite" to apprise the court of an individual's 
intention to claim the privilege.3 Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 164 
(1955) (holding that a defendant's "references to the Fifth Amendment were 
clearly sufficient to put the [Congressional] committee on notice of an apparent 
claim of the privilege."). As such, "[t]he privilege against self-incrimination is 
deemed waived by a defendant who takes the stand unless it is expressly 
invoked." State v. Jesser, 95 Idaho 43, 49, 501 P.2d 727, 733 (1972) (footnotes 
omitted); see also State v. Starry, 96 Idaho 148, 150, 525 P.2d 343, 345 (1974) 
(stating that the privilege against self-incrimination is waived unless it is 
"specifically invoked."). 
Here, Brown has failed to demonstrate that there was a clear or obvious 
violation of his Fifth Amendment rights at the sentencing because it is not clear 
that Brown was expressly or specifically invoking the privilege against self-
incrimination. See State v. Owen, 129 Idaho 920, 937, 935 P .2d 183, 200 (Ct. 
App. 1997) (holding that "the record is insufficient for us to declare that any error 
occurred" because the defendant failed "to assert any violation of a right against 
self-incrimination" and "[a]s a result, the question of violation of a right against 
3 This standard is similar to the standard for determining whether the Fifth 
Amendment right to counsel has been invoked. See State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 
445, _, 272 P.3d 417, 441 (2012) (quoting Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 
452, 459 (1994)) ("A suspect must unambiguously request counsel in order to 
invoke his Fifth Amendment right to counsel-'he must articulate his desire to 
have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the 
circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an 
attorney."'). 
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self-incrimination evidently was not submitted to the district court for decision" 
and "the district court did not rule on the issue"). Brown did not make any 
reference to the Fifth Amendment, nor did he give any indication that he thought 
his responses to the district court's questions regarding the facts of the crime he 
pied guilty to would be incriminating in any way. 
Under these circumstances, where the defendant does not put the district 
court on notice that he is refusing to answer questions on Fifth Amendment 
grounds, the district court has no opportunity to determine whether the refusal to 
answer is in fact justifiable under the privilege against self-incrimination. If Brown 
wanted to assert the privilege against self-incrimination, it was his duty to actually 
assert the privilege and to "sketch a plausible scenario of how a potential 
response would provide direct or circumstantial evidence of criminal conduct or 
clues leading to evidence of criminal conduct." Whiteley, 131 Idaho at 327-28, 
955 P.2d at 1106-07 (quoting McPherson, 112 Idaho at 405, 732 P.2d at 374). 
Brown failed to do either of those things at the sentencing hearing and he has 
therefore failed to satisfy the second prong of the fundamental error test. 
E. Brown Has Shown No Preiudice 
Brown has also made no showing that he was prejudiced by the alleged 
error. Under the third prong of the fundamental error test, "the defendant must 
further persuade the reviewing court that the error was not harmless; i.e., that 
there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected the outcome of the trial." 
State v. Jackson, 151 Idaho 376, _, 256 P.3d 784, 786 (Ct. App. 2011 ). When 
the error relates to sentencing, "the 'outcome' he must show to have been 
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affected is his sentence." Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 142, 129 
S.Ct.1423, 1433 n.4 (2009). 
In State v. Person, 145 Idaho 293, 297, 178 P.3d 658, 662 (Ct. App. 
2007), the defendant argued that his Fifth Amendment rights were violated when 
the district court denied his motion to redact suppressed statements that were 
included in his PSI. However, the Idaho Court of Appeals rejected this argument 
because although statements initially obtained in violation of the defendant's Fifth 
Amendment rights were included in the PSI, the defendant "rendered this 
essentially a moot point by failing to assert the privilege [against self-
incrimination] in regard to the PSI" and by voluntarily providing statements to the 
presentence investigator that implicated him to the same extent as his 
statements to law enforcement that were suppressed. 178 P.3d at 662. As 
such, the inclusion of the suppressed statements in the PSI "was of no 
consequence since Person had provided virtually the same information when he 
had been free to assert the privilege against self-incrimination." kl at 298, 178 
P.3d at 663. 
Similarly, even assuming that Brown could satisfy the first two prongs of 
the fundamental error test, he cannot demonstrate that the error was not 
harmless because he had already provided the information he claims was 
compelled by the district court at sentencing to the presentence investigator. 
(Compare 4/25/11 Tr., p.24, Ls.15-17; p.31, Ls.11 12; p.32, Ls.9-10 with PSI, 
p.5.) 
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At the sentencing hearing, the district court asked Brown several 
questions regarding Brown's motive for committing the crime he pied guilty to. 
These questions form the basis for Brown's claim on appeal that his Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination was violated. (Appellant's brief, 
pp.11-12.) Brown told the district court that he committed the crime because 
"Richard [Wilson] said he was going to kill my girlfriend's kids, so that's how we 
got here." (4/25/11 Tr., p.24, Ls.15-17.) Under the "Defendant's Version" of 
events contained in the PSI, Brown provided the same explanation that "Richard 
Wilson threatened his girlfriend, Wendy's infant .... " (PSI, p.5.) Although the 
district court did not recall at the sentencing hearing whether it had previously 
heard that explanation at another hearing or whether it was contained in the PSI 
(4/25/11 Tr., p.24, Ls.18-21 ), the record is clear that Brown provided the same 
information at the sentencing hearing regarding his motive that he had already 
provided to the presentence investigator. 
Because the statements Brown claims were compelled in violation of his 
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination at the sentencing hearing had 
already been voluntarily provided to the presentence investigator, and there is no 
indication that Brown attempted to invoke the privilege with respect to the PSI, 
the error that Brown alleges is harmless. Therefore, Brown has failed to satisfy 
the third prong of the fundamental error test and he has failed to establish that 
the district court violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination at 
the sentencing hearing. 
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11. 
Brown Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing 
Discretion 
A. Introduction 
Brown asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it imposed 
a unified sentence of 15 years with four years fixed for aggravated battery. 
(Appellant's brief, p.16.) Brown has failed to establish that the district court 
abused its sentencing discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion 
standard considering the defendant's entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 
722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 
50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 159 P.3d 838 
(2007)). It is presumed that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the 
defendant's probable term of confinement. Oliver, 144 Idaho at 726, 170 P.3d at 
391 (citing State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P .2d 552 (1999)). Where a 
sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of 
demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 
576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 
P.3d 27 (2000)). 
C. The District Court Acted Well Within Its Sentencing Discretion 
Brown asserts that the district court abused its discretion by imposing a 
unified sentence of 15 years with four years fixed upon his conviction for 
aggravated battery because the district court "inappropriately limited its 
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sentencing discretion" and "insufficiently considered several mitigating factors." 
(Appellant's brief, p.16.) Both of these arguments are without merit 
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant 
must show that the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the 
facts. Baker, 136 Idaho at 577, 38 P.3d at 615. A sentence is reasonable, 
however, if it appears necessary to achieve the primary objective of protecting 
society or any of the related sentencing goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or 
retribution. ~' 38 P.3d at 615. 
In fashioning an appropriate sentence, the district court considered 
Brown's background and character, his criminal history,4 the objectives of 
sentencing, and the potential for rehabilitation. generally 4/25/11 Tr., p.26, 
L.17 - p.33, L.15.) The district court also considered the fact that Brown "did 
come forward and take responsibility." (4/25/11 Tr., p.27, Ls.10-11.) The district 
court analyzed the factors set forth in I.C. § 19-2521 and noted that "the facts 
and circumstances here is [sic] a brutal attack on a completely innocent person" 
with "[h]orrific aftermath." (4/25/11 Tr., p.33, L.8 - p.35, L.23.) 
The district court went on to describe the significant injuries that the victim 
suffered as a result of Brown's attack and stated "you literally beat [the victim's] 
future out of him" and "this victim could have been dead." (4/25/11 Tr., p.36, 
Ls.23-24; p.38, L.11.) The district court repeatedly referred to the "facts and 
circumstances" of Mr. Brown's offense (4/25/11 Tr., p.29, Ls.4-5; p.35, Ls.16-18), 
4 Although Brown is relatively young, his criminal history includes five prior 
misdemeanor convictions and he had a pending felony drug charge in Oregon at 
the time he committed the instant offense. (PSI, pp.5-7.) 
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and found that "this is not a case, despite your lack of prior significant record, that 
I could even consider probation or retained jurisdiction, because under [LC. § 19-
2521 (1 )(c)], a lesser penalty would lessen the would depreciate the 
seriousness of the crime" (4/25/11 Tr., p.38, Ls.14-19). The district also found 
that imprisonment would provide appropriate punishment to Brown and it would 
provide an appropriate deterrent to other people in the community. (4/25/11 Tr., 
p.38, Ls.20-23.) The district court then determined that a period of incarceration 
was necessary in light of the brutal nature in which Brown committed the crime of 
aggravated battery and imposed a reasonable sentence. 
Brown's argument that "the district court felt it had no discretion to impose 
any sentence besides a prison term" is completely meritless. (Appellant's brief, 
p.17.) In support of this argument, Brown relies solely on State v. Izaguirre, 145 
Idaho 820, 186 P.3d 676 (Ct. App. 2008). (Appellant's brief, pp.17-18.) 
However, that case is distinguishable. In Izaguirre, 145 Idaho at 824, 186 P .3d 
at 680, the Idaho Court of Appeals held that the district court abused its 
discretion by making a "declaration that a twenty-five-year [determinate] 
sentence can never be sufficient" in a murder case, despite the fact that Idaho 
law allows for "a unified sentence ranging from as little as ten years up to life" 
and mandates "no minimum length for the determinate portion of the sentence" 
for second degree murder. 
Here, the district court appropriately considered the factors set forth in I.C 
§ 19-2521 and determined that probation or retained jurisdiction would not be 
appropriate based on the specific "facts and circumstances" of this case and the 
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"brutal" nature of the crime as Brown committed it. (4/25/11 Tr., p.33, L.8 - p.35, 
L.18.) The district court did not give any indication that it would impose a prison 
term in every aggravated battery case without considering the factors set forth in 
I.C. § 19-2521. Instead, the district court thoroughly considered the factors 
provided by the legislature and made appropriate findings supporting its 
determination that a term of imprisonment was justified based on the facts of this 
case. 
The sentence imposed was appropriate in light of the brutal nature of 
Browns offense, as well as the objectives of sentencing. Given any reasonable 
view of the facts, Brown has failed to establish an abuse of sentencing discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Brown's conviction 
and sentence. 
DATED this 15th day of May, 2012. 
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